

PRACTICE MODELS OF «HIDDEN ACTIONS» IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RECRUITMENT AGENCIES AND CUSTOMERS

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Abstract. The article focuses on the application of the model of opportunistic behavior in a relationship between recruitment agencies and their clients. Definition and essence of the model «hidden actions» are disclosed, the relevance of application of this model in the market of services is designated. In this article the situation is simulated in which the HR-manager of the company refers to the manager of recruitment agency in the limited choice of candidates. Author's calculation shows a high risk of unfair performance of the contract by agent (manager of recruitment agency). The author proposes to protect both sides of the contract by using translucence techniques by the principal and the signaling techniques by the agent. The article clearly demonstrated the effectiveness of the application of the mathematical model that takes into account the risks and ways to prevent them.

Keywords: recruitment agencies; «Hidden actions»; information asymmetry; moral hazard; ex post, translucence; signaling.

JEL codes: J63; C63; D83.

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